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Abstract—The Internet of things (IoT) is revolutionizing the
management and control of automated systems leading to a
paradigm shift in areas such as smart homes, smart cities, health
care, transportation, etc. The IoT technology is also envisioned to
play an important role in improving the effectiveness of military
operations in battlefields. The interconnection of combat equip-
ment and other battlefield resources for coordinated automated
decisions is referred to as the Internet of battlefield things (IoBT).
IoBT networks are significantly different from traditional IoT
networks due to the battlefield specific challenges such as the ab-
sence of communication infrastructure, and the susceptibility of
devices to cyber and physical attacks. The combat efficiency and
coordinated decision-making in war scenarios depends highly on
real-time data collection, which in turn relies on the connectivity
of the network and the information dissemination in the presence
of adversaries. This work aims to build the theoretical foun-
dations of designing secure and reconfigurable IoBT networks.
Leveraging the theories of stochastic geometry and mathematical
epidemiology, we develop an integrated framework to study the
communication of mission-critical data among different types of
network devices and consequently design the network in a cost
effective manner.
Index Terms—Battlefield, epidemics, internet of things, Poisson
point process.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of things (IoT) is an emerging paradigm that
allows the interconnection of devices which are equipped
with electronic sensors and actuators [1]. It allows for a
higher level of situational awareness and effective automated
decisions without human intervention. The concept has proven
to be extremely useful in applications such as smart homes,
energy management, smart cities, transportation, health care
and other areas [2]. Recently, there is an interest in the defence
community to leverage the benefits enabled by the IoT to
improve the combat efficiency in battlefields and effectively
manage war resources. This emerging area of using IoT
technology for defence applications is being referred to as
the Internet of battlefield things (IoBT) [3]. Fig. 1 illustrates a
typical battlefield comprising of heterogeneous objects, such
as soldiers, armoured vehicles, and aircrafts, that communicate
with each other amidst cyber-physical attacks from the enemy.
The IoBT has the potential to completely revolutionize
modern warfare by using data to improve combat efficiency as
well as reduce damages and losses by automated actions while
reducing the burden on human war-fighters. Currently, the
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems use millions
of sensors deployed on a range of platforms to provide
Fig. 1: A typical IoBT network with heterogeneous battlefield
things and random enemy attacks. Battlefield devices interact
with other devices within their communication range in a D2D
manner for exchange of mission critical information. The link
shape illustrates the piece of information being shared.
situational awareness to military commanders and troops,
on the ground, seas, and in the air [4]. However, the real
power lies in the interconnection of devices and sharing of
sensory information that will enable humans to make useful
sense of the massive, complex, confusing, and potentially
deceptive ocean of information. In the battlefield scenarios, the
communications between strategic war assets such as aircrafts,
warships, armoured vehicles, ground stations, and soldiers can
lead to improved coordination, which can be enabled by the
IoBT [5]. However, to become a reality, this vision will have to
overcome several technical limitations of current information
systems and networks.
Most civilian IoT applications such as smart homes and
cities are infrastructure based, where the devices are connected
to each other and the internet via an access point or gateway.
In the battlefield scenario, the communication infrastructure
such as cellular networks or base stations may not be available.
Hence, the battlefield things need to exploit device-to-device
(D2D) communications [6] to share information with other
things1. Therefore, the information sharing can be affected
by the physical parameters of the network such as the trans-
mission power of the things, the number of deployed things,
their locations, and the flexibility of communication between
different types of things. In addition to these factors, another
impediment in the connectivity of battlefield things is the
susceptibility to cyber-physical attacks. The information ex-
change between things may be affected by several factors such
as jamming of radio frequency channels, physical attacks on
1We use the terms “things” and “devices” interchangeably to refer to
battlefield things throughout the paper.
infrastructure, node failures due to attacks on power sources, or
lack of power, etc. Since the analytics and automated decisions
in an IoBT network rely on the real-time data provided by
the sensors deployed in the battlefield, we need to ensure the
spread of information in the networks with a certain level of
reliability and security to make accurate decisions.
Although the IoBT has to do to with much more beyond the
connectivity of battlefield things, such as digital analytics and
automated response, which allows the systems to react more
quickly and precisely than humans; however, the connectivity
aspect is vital in allowing the IoBT systems to unleash their
full potential. It is ideal if we can achieve complete situational
awareness and perfect information spreading throughout the
network. However, due to limited available resources, incurred
costs (capital and operational), and vulnerability to attacks, it
is not practical and hence requires a cost-effective, secure and
reconfigurable network design. Therefore, in this paper, we
first characterize the information dissemination in an IoBT
network and use it to design the network parameters to achieve
mission specific performance goals with minimal amount of
resources.
Stochastic geometry (SG) based models have been success-
fully used in the modeling and analysis of traditional wireless
networks such as cellular networks [7] and ad-hoc wireless
sensor networks [8]. These models accurately capture the
effect of spatial distribution of network devices and charac-
terize the resulting performance. On the other hand, epidemic
models [9] have been studied extensively for analyzing the
spread of viruses in computers, rumours in humans, and
infectious diseases in biological networks [10]–[12]. Although
these models are highly useful in capturing certain aspects of
the networks, none of them captures the unique characteris-
tics of IoBT networks. The SG models lack the capability
of analysing the dynamics of information dissemination in
networks. While a percolation study for SG models is available
to determine the connectivity of the network (as shown in [8]),
however, it does not capture the dynamics of information
dissemination and the effects of cyber-physical attacks. On the
other hand, epidemic models fail to incorporate the geometry
of the network and hence cannot give meaningful insights
in physically deployed communication networks. Moreover,
there are few descriptive models available in literature for
designing IoT networks, most of which are developed for
civilian applications [13] and do not incorporate the ad hoc
nature of IoT networks over battlefields. Hence, it is imperative
to develop an integrated design framework that can capture the
unique characteristics of IoBT networks.
In this paper, we develop a SG based model to characterize
the connectivity of IoBT networks in terms of the degree
distribution. We then use an epidemic spreading model to
capture the dynamic information dissemination within and
across networks of devices at the equilibrium state. The
resulting integrated open-loop system model is used as a basis
for reconfiguring the network parameters to ensure a mission-
driven information spreading profile in the network.
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Fig. 2: Heterogeneous IoBT network decomposed into virtual
layers, each containing devices of the same type.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first describe the geometry of the IoBT
network and propose an abstraction model using tools from
stochastic geometry. Then, we model the spread of information
in the heterogeneous IoBT network inspired from mathemati-
cal epidemiology.
A. Network Geometry
We consider a heterogeneous adhoc wireless network com-
posed of M different types of devices. Each device cor-
responds to a different battlefield thing such as a soldier
equipped with smart devices, armoured vehicle, ground sta-
tion, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), etc. The different types
of devices are characterized by their transmission power or
equivalently, the communication range rm in meters and the
uniform deployment density in R2 denoted by λm devices
per km2, ∀m = 1, . . . ,M . The communication range of the
devices is tunable in the interval [rminm ,r
max
m ], where r
min
m ≥ 0
and rmaxm ≥ r
min
m , ∀m = 1, . . . ,M . The devices of type m
can be abstracted as a homogeneous Poisson Point Process2
(PPP) [14] of intensity λm, denoted by Φm. Assuming that
each type of device is placed independently of the other
types, the combined IoBT network can be represented as a
PPP of intensity Λ3, denoted by Φ, where Λ =
∑M
m=1 λm.
Due to the absence of traditional communication infrastructure
such as base stations, the devices are only able to commu-
nicate using D2D communications, i.e., device xm of type
m can communicate with a device yn of type n only if
‖xm − yn‖ ≤ rm and vice versa, where ‖.‖ represents the
Euclidean distance. Hence, the communication links between
devices can be modeled using a random geometric graph
(RGG) [15] with a given connection radius. For the ease of
exposition of the network and connectivity between different
type of devices, we virtually decompose the network into M
layers, where each layer contains a different type of device.
An illustrative representation of the network model is provided
in Fig. 2. The connectivity between things of the same type,
labeled as intra-layer connectivity, the connectivity between
different type of things, labeled as inter-layer connectivity,
and the combined network connectivity are explained in the
subsequent subsections.
2The PPP assumption reflects the lack of structure in the spatial distribution
of the nodes and is appropriate to use in the case of a large number of nodes
where it is difficult to keep track of the topology.
3This result follows from the superposition theorem of PPPs [14].
B. Network Connectivity
In this subsection, we describe the connectivity between the
heterogeneous things in an IoBT network. The connectivity of
devices can be classified into intra-layer, inter-layer, and com-
bined network connectivity, which are explained as follows:
1) Intra-layer Connectivity: Within a particular network
layer m, devices can communicate with each other if they
are within a distance of rm of each other. The set of com-
munication neighbours of a typical device of type m, referred
to as xm, can be expressed as Nm(xm) = {ym ∈ Φm :
‖xm − ym‖ ≤ rm}. The connectivity of the RGG formed by
devices of typem is characterized by the degree of the devices,
denoted by Km, which is defined as the average number of
neighbours of each device, i.e., Km = |Nm(xm)|, where |.|
represents the set cardinality. Due to the PPP assumption, the
intra-layer degree, is a Poisson random variable in the mean
field, and can be expressed by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The intra-layer degree distribution of network
layer m can be expressed as follows:
P(Km = k) = e
−λmpir
2
m
(λmpir
2
m)
k
k!
, k ≥ 0, (1)
for sufficiently large λm and rm. The average intra-layer
degree of layer m can be expressed as E[Km] = λmpir
2
m.
From Fig. 2, it is easy to see that the average degree, or
equivalently the connectivity, depends on the density of the
deployed devices as well as the communication range.
2) Inter-layer Connectivity: The devices in one network
layer can communicate with the devices in other network
layers that are inside their region of influence. The region of
influence of a typical node at each layer is illustrated by the
projected circles as shown in Fig. 2. The set of devices of layer
n under the influence of a typical device at layer m can be
expressed asNmn(xm) = {y ∈ {Φm∪Φn} : ‖xm−y‖ ≤ rm}.
The inter-layer degree between layer m and n, denoted by
Kmn
4, can be expressed as Kmn = |Nmn(xm)|. Note that
the inter-layer degree is not symmetric, i.e., Kmn 6= Knm.
We assume reciprocity of communication between different
devices which is formally stated in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. We assume that the devices that are under
the influence of another type of device can also communicate
back with that device. In practice, this can be realized using
different radio interfaces or protocols for communicating
between different types of devices.
The inter-layer degree distribution is expressed by the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. The probability distribution of the inter-layer
degree between devices of layer m and n, denoted by Kmn,
can be written as follows:
P(Kmn = k) = e
−(λm+λn)pir
2
m
((λm + λn)pir
2
m)
k
k!
, k ≥ 0,
(2)
and the average inter-layer degree can be expressed as
E[Kmn] = (λm + λn)pir
2
m.
4With a slight abuse of notation, we denote Km as the average intra-layer
degree of devices in layer m and Kmn as the average inter-layer degree
between layer m and n.
3) Combined Network Connectivity: The total network
connectivity is characterized by the average degree of the
combined network. In the combined network, where all types
of devices are able to communicate with each other using
Assumption 1, the degree of each device is evaluated to be
the total number of devices of all types inside its area of
influence. The average total network degree is distributed as
a multi-modal Poisson random variable and can be expressed
by the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The degree of the combined network, denoted by
Ko, is distributed as follows:
P(Ko = k) =
1
Λ
M∑
m=1
λme
−Λpir2
m
(Λpir2m)
k
k!
, k ≥ 0, (3)
where Λ =
∑M
m=1 λm. The average degree of the combined
network can be expressed as E[Ko] =
∑M
m=1 λmpir
2
m.
Proof. See Appendix A
C. Information Dissemination
Each type of device in the IoBT network generates data
which need to be propagated to other devices of the same
type and/or different types of devices depending on the role
of that device. There are certain pieces of information that
needs to be shared among the same type of devices, e.g.,
soldiers need to communicate certain information with other
soldiers. On the other hand, there are pieces of information
that needs to be propagated from one network to the other,
e.g., sensors transmitting data to a control network. Moreover,
some information might be important for all network nodes
such as network health monitoring data or network discovery
beacons. We assume a time slotted system, in which the
devices communicate with other devices for a duration of τ
s. The effective information spreading rate between any two
devices within the communication range, denoted by α, can
be expressed as:
α = γ × (1− δ), (4)
where γ is the contact rate, i.e., the total number of transmis-
sion attempts made in the interval τ , and δ is the probability of
unsuccessful transmission due to cyber-physical attacks, which
we will refer to as threat level. Without loss of generality, we
can select the contact rate γ = 1, so effectively, α = 1− δ is
the probability of successful information transmission between
devices5. We assume a uniform threat level for all network
devices. Characterizing the threat level in battlefield scenarios
due to jamming and physical attacks, or other adversarial
actions has been explored in literature, e.g., [16] and [17],
and is beyond the scope of the current work. The dynamics
of information dissemination under a given threat level can be
described as follows:
1) Information Dynamics: The devices in the network
spread information from one device to another in a broadcast
manner in each time slot. This process is repeated in all the
time slots and the devices can either be in an uninformed state
or an informed state depending on the success of information
5There is no loss of generality since τ can be made arbitrarily small.
delivery. To model this behaviour and explain the dynamics
of information dissemination across the IoBT network, we use
the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model [18], which is
well studied in mathematical epidemiology. The information
dissemination in the network is directly related to the average
degree of the network, as described in Section II-B, which in
turn depends on the physical network parameters. Since the
network is random with potentially large number of devices,
we use the degree based mean-field approach, in which all
devices are considered to be statistically equivalent in terms
of the degree and the analysis is done on a typical device. The
information dissemination dynamics for a typical device can
therefore be written as follows [19]:
dI
(i)
k (t)
dt
= −I
(i)
k (t) + αk(1 − I
(i)
k (t))Θ
(i)(t), (5)
where I
(i)
k (t) denotes the density of informed devices
at time t with degree k and information strand i ∈
{m,mn, o}, ∀m,n = 1, . . . ,M .
Remark 1. A strand m refers to a message or piece of
information propagating in the network of devices of type m.
By extension, strand mn refers to the inter-layer information
between devices of type m and n that originates from layer
n. Finally, strand o refers to the global information that is
shared by all devices.
The first term in (5) explains the annihilation of information
with time, i.e., the informed devices return to the uninformed
state at a rate of unity. The second term accounts for the
creation of informed nodes due to the spreading. The rate
of increase in the density of informed nodes with degree
k is directly proportional to the degree, the probability of
successful transmission of information α, the probability that
the node with degree k is not informed, i.e., (1 − I
(i)
k (t)),
and the average probability that a neighbour of a device with
degree k is informed, denoted by Θ(i)(t). In our case, since
the network is PPP, i.e., uncorrelated,Θ(i)(t) can be expressed
as follows:
Θ(i)(t) =
∑
k≥0
kP(Ki = k)
E[Ki]
I
(i)
k (t), i ∈ {m,mn, o}, (6)
where P[Ki = k] and E[Ki] are evaluated in Section II-B.
2) Steady State Analysis: We are interested in determining
the steady state of the information dissemination. To this end,
we impose the stationarity condition, i.e., set
dI
(i)
k
(t)
dt
= 0. It
results in the following expression:
I
(i)
k =
αkΘ(i)(α)
1 + αkΘ(i)(α)
, i ∈ {m,mn, o}. (7)
Notice that Θ(i)(α) is now a constant that depends on α.
Now, (6) and (7) present a system of equations that needs to
be solved self-consistently to obtain the solution for Θ(i)(α)
and I
(i)
k . In the subsequent section, we deal with the solution
of the dynamical information spreading process for the IoBT
network.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first present a solution to the dynamical
information spreading system in IoBT networks and then use it
for the efficient design of IoBT networks for mission-specific
battlefield applications.
A. Equilibrium Analysis
Equilibrium analysis provides us with the steady-state sit-
uation of the information in the network. Although, with the
changes in network topology and other network configurations,
the actual information spread might be different; however, the
equilibrium state provides us with a reasonable understanding
of the system behavior. In order to find the equilibrium
solution, we need to solve the self-consistent system expressed
in (6) and (7). In fact, it reduces to obtaining a solution to the
following fixed-point system:
Θ(i)(α) =
1
E[Ki]
∑
k≥0
kP(Ki = k)
αkΘ(i)(α)
1 + αkΘ(i)(α)
, (8)
for i ∈ {m,mn, o}, ∀m,n = 1, . . . ,M . An obvious solution
for this fixed-point system is Θ(i)(α) = 0; however, it is trivial.
It can be shown that (8) may have at least one solution in
the domain Θ(i)(α) > 0 depending on the value of α (See
Appendix B). The condition for this bifurcation to hold is
α ≥ E[Ki]
E[K2
i
]
. We show that this bifurcation point is unique in
the domain 0 < Θ(i)(α) ≤ 1 (See Appendix C). Obtaining
this solution in closed form for a PPP setting is not always
possible due to the complicated form of P(Ki = k). Hence,
an approximate solution can be obtained using the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. If a non-zero solution exists for the information
spreading dynamics in (6) and (7), i.e., α ≥ E[Ki]
E[K2
i
]
, then for
E[Ki] ≫ 1, a lower bound approximation of the average
probability that a neighbour of a device with degree k is
informed, can be expressed as follows:
Θˆ(i)(α) ≈ max
(
0, 1−
1
αE[Ki]
)
, (9)
Proof. See Appendix D.
As shown in Appendix D, the solution is a lower bound
for the true solution and becomes a tight approximation for
E[Ki] ≫ 1. In the IoBT network, the physical interpretation
of E[Ki] is the average number of communication neighbours
of a device related to information strand i ∈ {m,mn, o}. It is
reasonable to assume that E[Ki]≫ 1 due to the potential high
density of devices in IoBT networks and hence, the solution
presented in Theorem 1 is indeed a good approximation to the
true solution. The corresponding solution for the density of
informed devices Iˆ
(i)
k can be obtained by substituting (9) into
(7). The average density of informed devices with information
strand i can then be evaluated as:
Iˆ(i) =
∑
k≥0
Iˆ
(i)
k P(Ki = k). (10)
B. Secure and Reconfigurable Network Design
Once the equilibrium point for the information dissemina-
tion has been determined, the next step is to design the IoBT
network to achieve mission specific goals while efficiently
using battlefield resources. In essence, the network design
implies tuning the knobs of the network, which in the case
of IoBT networks are the transmission ranges and the node
deployment densities of the different types of battlefield things.
The problem is eventually to find the modes of the intra-layer
and iter-layer degree distributions of the network. The objec-
tive is to ensure a certain information spreading profile in the
network while deploying the minimum number of devices and
using the minimum transmit power. Let λ = [λ1 λ2 . . . λM ]
T
represent the vector of device deployment densities and r =
[r1 r2 . . . rM ]
T be the vector of communication ranges of
each of the devices in the IoBT network. The minimum density
of each device in the network, determined by the mission
requirements, is denoted by λmin = [λmin1 λ
min
2 . . . λ
min
M ]
T ,
λminm ≥ 0, ∀m = 1, . . . ,M . The maximum deployment
density of each device, defined by the capacity of the available
devices, is denoted by λmax = [λmax1 λ
max
2 . . . λ
max
M ]
T ,
λmaxm ≥ λ
min
m , ∀m = 1, . . . ,M . Similarly, the tunable
transmission range limits of the devices can be expressed as
r
min = [rmin1 r
min
2 . . . r
min
M ]
T , rminm ≥ 0, ∀m = 1, . . . ,M ,
and rmax = [rmax1 r
max
2 . . . r
max
M ]
T , rmaxm ≥ r
min
m , ∀m =
1, . . . ,M . Ifw = [w1 w2 . . . wM ]
T such that
∑M
m=1wm = 1
represents the weight vector corresponding to the relative
capital cost of deploying each type of device, and p represents
the unit operational power cost signifying the importance of
network power consumption, then a cost function for the
network with densities λ and transmission ranges r can be
expressed as follows:
c(λ, r) =
M∑
m=1
wmλmA+ p
M∑
m=1
λmAr
η
m, (11)
where A represents the area of the battlefield in km2 and η
denotes the path-loss exponent6. The first term represents the
total deployment cost of all the network devices while the
second term represents the total energy cost of operating all the
devices with transmission range r. The weights w can depend
on several factors such as the time required for deployment, the
monetary cost involved, or the number of devices available in
stock, etc. We can then formulate the secure and reconfigurable
network design problem as follows:
minimize
λ,r
c(λ, r) (12)
subject to I(m) ≥ Tm,m = 1, . . . ,M, (13)
I(mn) ≥ Tmn, (m,n) = 1, . . . ,M, (14)
I(o) ≥ To, (15)
λ
min ≤ λ ≤ λmax, rmin ≤ r ≤ rmax, (16)
where Ti ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {m,mn, o}, are the desired mission-
specific intra-layer, inter-layer, and global network information
spreading thresholds. Since the knobs for certain types of
devices in the network may not be tunable, we do not have
complete freedom in selecting the parameters to minimize
the cost function. This constrained action space can be in-
corporated into the optimization by setting λminm = λ
max
m or
rminm = r
max
m for any type m device for which the parameter
is not tunable. Since computing Iˆ(i) in (10) in closed form is
not possible due to the form of P(Ki = k) for the considered
network, obtaining a solution of the constrained optimization
problem in (12)-(16) is intractable. Therefore, we propose a
6The power consumption of a device of type m is proportional to r
η
m.
TABLE I: Physical Parameter Ranges.
Deployment Density (km−2) Transmission Range (m)
λmin
1
λmax
1
λmin
2
λmax
2
rmin
1
rmax
1
rmin
2
rmax
2
0.1 10 1 40 100 1000 10 500
sub-optimal approach to avoid this intractability while still
yielding a plausible solution. Instead of ensuring that the aver-
age densities of informed devices Iˆ(i) exceeds the respective
thresholds Ti, i ∈ {m,mn, o}, we impose a constraint on the
densities of informed devices that possess a degree equal to the
average degree of the network. In other words, we ensure that
Iˆ
(i)
E[Ki]
≥ T ′i for some T
′
i < Ti, i ∈ {m,mn, o}. It is reasonable
because the proportion of devices with the mean degree
contribute the most in the average information spreading. The
resulting problem, after substituting the required expressions
from Lemma 1, 2, and 3, simplifies to the following:
minimize
λ,r
c(λ, r) (17)
subject to λmpir
2
m ≥
1
α(1 − T ′m)
, ∀m = 1, . . . ,M, (18)
(λm + λn)pir
2
m ≥
1
α(1− T ′mn)
, ∀(m,n) = 1, . . . ,M,
(19)
M∑
m=1
λmpir
2
m ≥
1
α(1− T ′o)
, (20)
λ
min ≤ λ ≤ λmax, rmin ≤ r ≤ rmax. (21)
Note that the objective and constraints are biconvex in the
feasible solution space, i.e., λmin ≤ λ ≤ λmax, rmin ≤ r ≤
r
max with λmin ≥ 0 and rmin ≥ 0. Hence, the problem
can be solved using constrained biconvex programming tech-
niques [20]. The battlefield area A is a common factor in
the objective function and can be safely removed from the
optimization problem.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we provide the results obtained by testing
the developed framework under different battlefield missions.
For the ease of interpretation of results, we assume a bi-layer
IoBT network comprising ofM = 2 types of battlefield things.
The first type of devices is assumed to be commanders and the
second type is assumed to be followers. The assumption yields
a simple yet natural network configuration in a battlefield,
e.g., being composed of soldiers and distributed commanding
units. Let m = 1 correspond to the commander layer of the
network and m = 2 correspond to the follower layer. The
allowable physical parameter ranges of the respective devices
are selected as in Table I unless otherwise stated. The param-
eters imply that the commanders have a higher transmission
range but lower deployed density while the followers have a
smaller communication range but higher deployment density.
In practice, the limits can be based on tactical requirements of
the missions. The weights representing the relative deployment
cost are chosen to be w1 = 0.8 and w2 = 0.2 implying that
the deployment cost of the commanding units is much higher
than the follower units. The unit cost of power p is selected
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Fig. 3: Optimal network parameters for the intelligence mission.
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Fig. 4: Optimal network parameters for the encounter mission.
according to the importance of each mission and the path-loss
exponent η = 4.
A. Mission Scenarios
In the battlefields, there can be several types of missions
such as intelligence, surveillance, encounter battle, espionage,
reconnaissance, etc. In our results, we will focus particularly
on the two most common mission scenarios, i.e., intelligence
and encounter battle. Both of them have completely different
requirements in terms of the information flow in the network,
which are described as follows:
1) Intelligence: In the intelligence mission, the goal is to
provide commanders with the information from a range of
sources to assist them in operational or campaign planning.
It implies that there is a need for strong coordination in the
follower network, i.e., soldiers and other sensors, as well as
reliable flow of information from the follower network to
the commander network. The coordination among commander
network may not be that critical. Hence, to emulate such an
intelligence mission, we select the following set of information
spreading thresholds: T1 = 0, T2 = 0.7, T12 = 0.8, T21 = 0,
and To = 0.7. The unit cost of power is selected to be high,
i.e., p = 40, which signifies the preference of the network
to spend less on power consumption during intelligence.
The optimal physical parameters obtained for the intelligence
mission against increasing threat level δ are shown in Fig. 3.
There are several interesting observations in the intelligence
mission. A general trend is that the required transmission
ranges and deployment densities increases as the threat level
increases. Consequently, the cost function, which signifies the
deployment and operation cost of the network, also increases
as shown in Fig. 3(c). Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) show that the
transmission range of the commanders is always higher than
the followers while the densities of the followers is higher
than that of the commanders. This observation makes sense
as the followers equipped with sensors should be more in the
total number while the commander network should have a
larger influence area to be able to gather information for the
intelligence mission. Another important observation is that the
framework tends to increase the deployment density of the
devices first before increasing their transmission ranges. It is
due to a high cost of power consumption that tends to force
the devices to minimize the transmission ranges.
2) Encounter Battle: In the encounter battle or meeting
engagement scenario, there is a contact between the battling
forces. In such situations, commanders need to act quickly to
gain advantage over the opponents. This requires robust infor-
mation spreading from the command network to the follower
network. Hence, there is a need for strong coordination among
commanders and a reliable information flow from commanders
to followers. Additionally, the common status information
sharing between all network devices must be high to ensure
accurate decision-making. Therefore, we set the following
information spreading thresholds: T1 = 0.6, T2 = 0, T12 = 0,
T21 = 0.7, and To = 0.7. In addition, the unit cost of power
is selected to be low, i.e., p = 8, which implies a willingness
of the network to spend more on power consumption during
the encounter battle. Also, we fix the deployment density of
the commanding devices as λmin1 = λ
max
1 = 5 km
−2 since
it may not be practical to increase or decrease the number of
commanders during an encounter battle. The resulting optimal
parameters against the changing threat level are presented in
Fig. 4. In contrast with the intelligence mission, the framework
tends to increase the transmission ranges of the devices first
before increasing deployment, in the encounter battle. This
observation is a result of the lower unit power cost for the
encounter battle. Fig. 4(a) shows that the transmission range
of the commanders and followers increases as the threat level
increases until the capacity of the follower devices is reached
at δ = 0.4. To counter higher levels of threat, the framework
increases the deployment of follower nodes while the density
of commanders is fixed as shown in Fig. 4(b). Once the
threat level is higher than δ = 0.7, the transmission range
of the followers is actually reduced to decrease power cost as
increasing the device density is directly related to the power
consumption. The cost function for the encounter battle in
Fig. 4(c) is lower than the intelligence mission in Fig. 3(c)
mainly due to the difference in power cost.
Many other interesting mission scenarios can be emulated
by defining the information thresholds as well as the physically
constrained network parameters. Moreover, further insights
can be obtained by investigating the behaviour of the system
with more sophisticated network structure, i.e., more types of
devices and their respective roles. However, in this work, we
do not delve into these details since they are specific to the
battlefield missions and the actual combat equipment used in
the battlefields.
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a generic framework for
secure and reconfigurable design of IoT empowered battlefield
networks. The framework provides a tractable approach to tune
the physical network parameters to achieve the desired real-
time data dissemination among different types of battlefield
devices according to the assigned missions. It takes into
account the perceived threat level from the opponent as well
as the costs involved in deployment and operation of combat
equipment to provide a robust and cost effective design of
communication networks in battlefields which can be highly
useful in military planning. Optimized network parameters are
provided for the two typical mission scenarios of intelligence
and encounter battle in which the desired information spread-
ing direction is completely opposite to one another. Results
have shown that the mission goals can be achieved by either
changing the deployment of combat units or by changing their
transmission powers or both in response to a changing threat
perception, according to the design preferences.
Although, the IoT is being widely accepted and appreciated
by the commercial sector due to the huge economic impact,
the military is still reluctant to adopt this technology due to the
privacy and security issues. The main concern is that without
proper safeguards, this linkage of systems provided by IoBT
could be compromised leading to disastrous consequences.
Hence, the privacy and security aspects of IoBT are one of the
major challenges that need to be addressed by the researchers.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Let x denote a typical device in the combined network. The
probability that device x has a degree k can be expressed as
follows:
P(x ∈ Φm)P(Ko = k|x ∈ Φm) (22)
Now, P(x ∈ Φm) =
λm
Λ and P(Ko = k|x ∈ Φm) =
exp(−Λpir2
m
)(Λpir2
m
)k
k! . Substituting these in (22) and summing
over all possible values of m proves the result.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF UNIQUENESS
To prove that the fixed point equation described by (8) has
a unique solution in the domain Θ(i) > 0, we make use
of the Banach fixed-point theorem (or contraction mapping
theorem) [21]. We prove that the functional
F (Θ(α)) =
1
E[Ki]
E
[
K2i αΘ(α)
1 +KiαΘ(α)
]
(23)
experiences a contraction for allΘ(α) ∈ (0, 1]. More precisely,
we prove that |F (Θ1(α)) − F (Θ2(α))| ≤ c|Θ1(α) − Θ2(α)|
for any Θ1(α),Θ2(α) ∈ [0, 1], where 0 ≤ c < 1. The fact that
the constant c is strictly less than 1 implies that the functional
is contracted. The proof is as follows:
|F (Θ1(α)) − F (Θ2(α))| =∣∣∣∣ 1E[Ki]E
[
K2i αΘ1(α)
1 +KiαΘ1(α)
]
−
1
E[Ki]
E
[
K2i αΘ2(α)
1 +KiαΘ2(α)
]∣∣∣∣ ,
=
|Θ1(α)−Θ2(α)|
E[Ki]
E
[
K2i α
(1 +KiαΘ1(α))(1 +KiαΘ2(α))
]
.
(24)
To complete the proof, we need to show that
1
E[Ki]
E
[
K2i α
(1 +KiαΘ1(α))(1 +KiαΘ2(α))
]
< 1, (25)
Let g(Ki) =
K2
i
α
(1+KiαΘ1(α))(1+KiαΘ2(α))
. It can be proved that
g(Ki) is concave for Ki ≥ 0 by showing that g′′(Ki) <
0, ∀Ki ≥ 0. Therefore, using Jensen’s inequality [22], we
can say that E[g(Ki)] ≤ g(E[Ki]), with equality iff Ki is
deterministic. It follows that
1
E[Ki]
E
[
K2i α
(1 +KiαΘ1(α))(1 +KiαΘ2(α))
]
<
E[Ki]α
(1 + E[Ki]αΘ1(α))(1 + E[Ki]αΘ2(α))
=
1
Θ1(α) + Θ2(α) + E[Ki]αΘ1(α)Θ2(α) +
1
E[Ki]α
. (26)
The expression in (26) is strictly less than 1 only if the
following condition is satisfied:
Θ1(α) + Θ2(α) + E[Ki]αΘ1(α)Θ2(α) +
1
E[Ki]α
> 1. (27)
The condition in (27) depends on the relative magnitudes of
the quantities E[Ki] and α. Regardless, it reveals that we need
to exclude the values of Θ(α) that are too close to zero. For
sufficiently large values of Θ(α), it is clear from (27), that
F (Θ(α)) is indeed a contraction with respect to the absolute
value metric. Hence, by the contraction mapping theorem,
F (Θ(α)) has a unique fixed point in the domain Θ(α) > 0.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF EXISTENCE
The non-zero equilibrium solution can be obtained by
solving the following equation:
1 =
1
E[Ki]
E
[
K2i α
1 +KiαΘ(α)
]
. (28)
Let h(Θ(α)) = 1
E[Ki]
E
[
K2
i
α
1+KiαΘ(α)
]
. We need to find a
solution to the equation h(Θ(α)) = 1 in the domain 0 <
Θ(α) ≤ 1. It is clear that h(Θ(α)) is monotonically decreasing
for Θ(α) > 0. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that h(0) > 1
and h(1) < 1 for a unique non-zero solution to exist for the
equation h(Θ(α)) = 1. This result is proved below:
h(0) =
1
E[Ki]
E
[
K2i α
]
= α
E[K2i ]
E[Ki]
, (29)
h(1) =
1
E[Ki]
E
[
K2i α
1 +Kiα
]
=
1
E[Ki]
E
[
Ki
Kiα
1 +Kiα
]
,
<
1
E[Ki]
E[Ki] = 1. (30)
In (30), the inequality follows from the fact that Kiα1+Kiα <
1, ∀Ki > 0, α > 0. A non-zero solution to (28) exists only if
h(0) ≥ 1, which implies that α ≥ E[Ki]
E[K2
i
]
.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Obtaining the non-zero solution for the fixed point equation
(8) in closed form is not possible since we need to solve the
following equation for Θ(α):
1 =
1
E[k]
∞∑
k=0
K2i α
1 +KiαΘ(α)
P (Ki), (31)
where P (Ki) =
e−λipir
2
i (λipir
2
i
)K
i
Ki!
. Therefore, we resort to find
an approximation for the solution which is asymptotically ac-
curate. Let g(Ki) =
K2
i
α
1+KiαΘ(α)
. Since g′′(Ki) > 0, ∀Ki ≥ 0,
so g(Ki) is a convex function for Ki ≥ 0. Using Jensen’s
inequality, we can say that E[g(Ki)] ≥ g(E[Ki]), with equality
only if Ki is deterministic. This implies the following:
E
[
K2i α
1 +KiαΘ(α)
]
>
E[Ki]
2α
1 + E[Ki]αΘ(α)
. (32)
Therefore, we can write (31) as follows:
1 >
E[Ki]α
1 + E[Ki]αΘ(α)
, (33)
which leads to the final solution,
Θ(α) > 1−
1
αE[Ki]
. (34)
Using our prior knowledge that Θ(α) ≥ 0, we need to ensure
that αE[Ki] ≥ 1. In general, the complete solution can be
expressed as Θ(α) > max(0, 1 − 1
αE[Ki]
). To measure the
accuracy of this bound, we solve the fixed-point equation
exactly using an fixed-point iteration and compare the results
for different values of α and E[Ki] = λipir
2
i . We choose a
fixed ri = 0.2 km and λi = [25, 50, 100] km
−2, which results
in E[Ki] = [3.14, 6.28, 12.57]. A plot of the results is provided
in Fig. 5. It can be observed that the lower bound obtained
using Jensen’s inequality is tight for all values of α when
E[Ki]≫ 1.
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